Book

Description

The Indian Constitution stands as a unique and intricate legal document, perpetually sparking academic and public debate regarding its fundamental character. Is it truly federal, or does it lean more towards a unitary structure, perhaps best described as 'quasi-federal' or 'sui generis'? This book delves into the very 'nature' of the Indian Constitution, meticulously dissecting the arguments and evidence surrounding its federal and unitary dimensions. Moving beyond simplistic classifications, this comprehensive analysis explores the historical underpinnings and the Constituent Assembly debates that shaped India’s unique constitutional architecture. It critically examines the distribution of legislative, executive, and financial powers between the Union and the States, highlighting the constitutional provisions that ostensibly point towards a federal design, such as the Seventh Schedule and the independent judiciary.   However, the book equally scrutinizes the powerful centralizing tendencies embedded within the Constitution. Chapters meticulously analyze the Union's pervasive powers during emergencies (Articles 352, 356, 360), its authority over residuary subjects, the appointment of Governors, and the integrated judicial system. Special attention is paid to how judicial pronouncements, particularly from the Supreme Court, have interpreted and reinterpreted these provisions over decades, influencing the federal-unitary balance. The book explores landmark cases that have shaped the discourse, from early decisions affirming central authority to later judgments emphasizing cooperative federalism. Furthermore, the work addresses contemporary challenges and evolving dynamics, such as the impact of economic reforms, the role of centrally sponsored schemes, and the growing clamor for greater fiscal autonomy by states.